The produced wealth comes first from the amount of work

The question of the relationship between demography and growth is rarely mentioned. The ambitious Lisbon strategy for growth and employment was in 2000 mainly on technologies of information and the knowledge economy to ensure Europe's future and its power on the international stage by 2010.

In a recent "Futuribles" magazine article, we showed that, since a quarter of a century, the gap of about one point average annual growth between the United States and Europe is explained for the most part (80) by lesser population dynamics. The gap which would stem from many factors: improvement of productive efficiency, capital accumulation, increasing the number of hours worked per capita, or multiplier effects of final demand by this demographic dynamic.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the France recorded an equal GDP growth or less than the average European, which is a poor performance has held its best demographic dynamics. The France back in standard of living to its major partners, with the exception of the Germany, if not for demographic reasons, but because of a number of hours worked per capita low countries developed.

The produced wealth comes first from the amount of work. Differences in standard of living (wealth produced) per capita are not explained by levels of productivity (hourly or assets) different, but simply by the amount of work provided by the people of each country. The France is by far the country working the least per capita in a year: the American of today works 46 more, on average, than the English, 23 more Spanish and French 32 more. If a coup of magic wand, the French worked as much as the Americans while keeping the same productivity, they would increase their standard of living of 8,000 euros per year. It is the activity that creates wealth, and therefore employment. Even if the conclusion is clear, it is all the more difficult to admit that, moreover, we we boast, wrongly, to have a level of hourly productivity, or by active employee, higher than that of the United States!

Indeed, the concept to which reference is made was formerly called of apparent labour productivity measured in very coarse manner, by dividing the GDP by the number of assets. Our apparent labour productivity is an indicator of exclusion of those who do not run fairly quickly. To understand, consider the image of pupils of a school class, committed to a 100 metres. If they participate in the race, their average speed will be less than that obtained by that run 50 faster. In France, there are few runners, but they are very productive, because we keep only the best.

Americans work more, if there is a demand solvent to meet, perhaps more than elsewhere, due to population growth. We suggest here a new hypothesis, that of a demographic multiplier which would be initially to significant productivity gains higher in the United States than in Europe. Productivity is the residue of additional growth, not explained by the increase of capital and labour. Lack of a better, additional GDP by assets growth is attributed to technical progress, which is a positive way to designate the residue not explained.

The variation in GDP by assets is particularly significant that the number of occupied assets and opportunities increase, in an expanding population. This multiplier would better enlighten the drop of GDP growth by assets, observed since the beginning of the years 2000 between the United States and Europe, that the alleged delay technology. Europe itself is its main market. To avoid the prospect of grey hair and a soft growth in Europe, we call our greeting a demographic boost and a European policy for families with children.